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NOTE AND COMMENT
WII.t.$--R£rocA'l'IoN BY JUDICIAL L!:Gtst.ATioN.-Wills and their revocation
as we know them are peculiarly the result of the actions and reactions of our
common and statute law. We are sufficiently familiar with statutes, declaratory of the common law, in derogation thereof, and creating entirely new
principles of law. We also know law the result of no legislative act. Wbatey~ may or may not be admitted about court-made law, we see the undoubted fact that the great body of our law is the outgrowth of_ d~isions applying
to new conditions principles of law found in analogous cases, whereby the
common law is able to adapt itself to our changing conditions, and keep step
with the march of progress. We are not unaccustomed to judicial interpretation that practica1Jy nullifies statutes, or gives to them an effect that would
surprise the legislators originating them. We do not so often come upon pretty
open contests between court and legislature, cases of judicial usurpation resulting in rules of law flatly contradictory to the words of the statutes.
A notable instance is found in the law as to revocation of wills, and an
·excursion through a certain line of cases interesting not merely for this,
but also for the curious mistakes of judges and text writers in studying and
applying the precedents relied upon to establish the rule. Feudal requirements long delayed the right by will to dispose of lands, and there was not
much personalty to bequeath. Such as there was might be bequeathed very
informally, and by resort to uses a praCtlcal way was found to make what
amounted to testamentary disposition of lands. After 1540; Statute 32 Henry
VIll, this could be done by last will and testament in writing. No form or
signature was required; and personalty was disposable as before. See Butler
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and Bakers case, 3 Coke 25, 31, ;6 Eng. Rep. 684. and footnotes. For the
purpose of this note this statute is of small moment The Statute of Frauds
and the Statute I Vict. are the great statutes of wilts, and the former, more
largely than the latter, has furnished the model for Ameri~ statutes.
Hence cases under the Statute of Frauds are of greater ·interest in most
American jurisdictions.
The Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Charles II, c. 3, required devises to be "in
writing and signed by the partj so devising." They must also be duly attested and subscribed by witnesses. Bequests of personalty might still be
qral, but nuncupative wilts were strictly limited, though no formal requirements were made for written wills of persooalty. The Statute I Viet required the same formalities for the testamentary disposition of real and
personal property. Frauds and perjuries had occurred not merely in setting
up wills, but also in attempting to prove revocation by word of mouth. The
Statute of Frauds, therefore, provided in section VI that no devise, nor any
clause thereof, should be revocable otherwise than by certain destructive
acts to the instrument. or by certain specified instruments declaring the same.
To make doubly sure, the section says this over in another way, declaring
that "all devises and bequests(?) of lands and tenements shall remain and
continue.in force" until revoked in one of those specified ways. And finally,·
for treble assurance the section concludes, "any .former law or usage to the
contrary notwithstanding." · This is said, though doubtfully, to have been
drawn by CHANC£1.I.Oll NOTTINGHAK, as the result of a very shocking case
of perjury and subo~ation of perjury in proving revocation of a will, a
case tried before him the year previous, 1676. Cole v. Mordaunt, in a note 4
V~. 196, also discusSed in Prince v. Hazleton, 20 Johns. ,502 (CH. K!NT).
· It was doubtless supposed that by these very positive words ~e door
was bolted, barred and sCaled against the admission of any other maqner of
revocation, and so it seemed to BAJION Pi:uor. Not so to his brother. barons,
who soon found that no revocation "otherwise than by the ways specified"
had left as before revocations implied 'by law ! Christopher v. Christopher,
Dick. 445, and so it was held in K~bel v. Scraftolf., 2 East 530, per Lu.
~JIOUGH, and after great consideration by all. the judges of the three
courts of Westminster-Hall in Marston· v. Roe d. Fox, 8 Ad. & El. 14. per
TINDAi. C. ]. (1838). Parliament, seeing how the attacking forces of" the common law had made inroads on the undoubted territory embraced by the ·Statute of Frauds as t.o revocation, took counsel of strategy, and determined to
provide for revocation by changed circumstances, but tb do it in· its own
way, and so indubitably that the c0urts should not venture "another attack.
It did ·not require both marriage ·and. birth· of a child, but by the Statute
I Viet., c. :26, 1837, it enacted that, I. "Every will made Dy a man or woman
shall be revoked. by '1is or her marriage" (except in certain cases under a
power); 2. "no will .shall be revoked by any presumption of an intention on
~e ground of ~ alteration of circums~c~s," and 3. "no will or codicil, or
any part thereof shall be revoked otherwise. than as aforesaid, or" by other
means specified, these being mainly as named in the Statute of Frauds. Thus
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were the courts forbidden ·to invent any more methods of revocation. And
they bve obeyed, as will later appear; with very absurd results in scime
cases. But for these; Parliament and not the courts may be blamed.
Such was the iaw as to wills made from and after Jan. I, 1838. In 18s8,
the case of Goods of Cadywold, came on to be decided by ~t most learned
judge of probate law, Sm Cusswa.i. CusWEU.. In that case one T. Cadywold made a will devising all his rcat estate to Elizabeth Soundy, bis intended
wife. for life. and then for the benefit of any children they might have living at bis decease. or born in due time aft~ds, and the residue of bis
personal estate to bis intended wife absolutely. Thomas and Elizabeth carried out their marital plans, and in cour14? of time he died, leaving her and
four children surviving him. Then the question arose whether his widow,
and executrix, could have probated this will which bad been made for this
very purpose. And the Q. C. Dr. Addams who bad been instructed to move
for probate of this paper, on the strength of Marsto11 v. Fox., npra, "appreltended it could not be granted." With this agreed Sm CussW£I.J. CaEssWJtU.,
who said, "It seems at first sight rather startling to say that a will like the
present. executed in contemplation of marriage*** should be revoked by
such marriage." but on the cases cited so the law stands.
·
Now it does not appear that Sir Cresswell was relying on the positive
provision of 1 Viet. that marriage revokes a will, and be should not. for
though the WC was.decided in 18s8, the will W!lS made in 1828, and therefore
·did not fall under 1 Viet. When we tum to the ·cases cited we find that
Marstor. v. Fox, npra, decided that notwithstanding th~ Statute of Frauds,
co11tra, the courts bad let in another manner of revocation, i. e., by prcsump1ion of law from a change in the testator's circumstances. This chan;Je was
marriage and birth of a child or children. On the strength of this prcsump1ion, which was a rigid-though court-made-presumption of law, and depended not .at all on the intent of the testator, this will of T. Cadywold,
which he bad made for the express purpose of providing for bis wife an~
children, by the very fact that be bad the wife and children was utterly revoked I Even while dtey were doing it the courts admitted very great difficulty in· reconciling their work with the positive words of the Statute (Lom>
EUENBOROUGH, C. J., in Kmebel v. Scraftoa, 2 East 541), and some cases baYe
gone the length of calling it usurpation of legislative power, Hoitt v. Hoitt,
63 N. H. 475. Nevertheless, the English courts firmly stood on the ground
they bad seize_d, and the American courts have generally adopted the same
rule. Bnuls v. Wilkins 4 Johns. Cb. 506, per Cu. KENT, Warre11 v. Bea;ls 4
Gray 162, Per SHAW C. J.
.
But to return to th!'! Cadywold c;ase. As it ~ decided twenty years after
this last etiict of Parliament bad changed the statute law, it was not probable many, or any cases, of wills under the old Statute of Frauds would
raise that precise question again. We arc not surprised therefore that the
Cadywold case bas not been much referred to by the courts, though it bas
been very much cited by the text writers, sometimes as applying to I Viet.,
which is, of course. a great error, e. g. The Laws of England, The Earl of
Halsbury, Vol. 28 p. 562. The curious· thing is that the editor of an edition
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of Jarman's classical Treatise on Wills, which appeared shortly after the
Cadywold decision, cites this case, p. 125, with the remark that the decision
in Kenebel v. Sera/Ion-, 2 East 530, was overlooked by Sir C. Cresswell, and
his decision, therefore, cannot be taken as an authority. And Redfield in his
Law of Wills, which appeared soon after, fell into the same crr9r, and referred approvingly to this footnote in Jarman. But the reportS of the
Cadywold case all show Kenebel v. Sera/Ion not only was not overlooked, but
it was on the strength that case that the widow was advised to try to probate
the will. Sec rSw. & Tr. 34. ZJ L. J.P. 36, 6 W.R. 375. But Dr. Addams,
Q. C., in following his instnictions to move for its probate, apprehends that the
law being as •held in Marston v. Roe d. Fox. 8 A. & E. 14. it could not be
granted. Evidently neither he nor Sir C. Cresswell read ejther of those cases,
since both Kenebel v. Sera/ton and Marston v. Fox confine the rule of revocation to cases in which there is a failure to provide for the wife and child,
and expressly hold that the will is not revoked if it makes provision for both.
That is precisely what this Cadywold will was intended to do, and hence there
should have been no revocation under the rule of Marston v. Fox, npra.
Dr. Addams refers to another case, viz., Israeli v. Rodon, 2 Moore P. C., 51,
which was an appeal from the Court of Ordinary in Jamaica. This was a
case decided in 1839, in which this same .Dr. Addams, not then a Q. C., appeared, to argue for a revocation of the will. The Privy Council, speaking
through Sir Herbert Jenner, agreed with him, not on the ground that there
was no provision for the wife and child, but that~e provision was not adequate- enough to repel the presumption of revocation. That the estates must
have been considerable would appear from a quarrel the widow had with the
trustees over the disposition of the produce. lsraell v. RodoK, 2 Moore P. C•
.p. This adequacy ·of provision was reading a new element into the rule, not
found in MarstoK v. Fox, npra, nor in other'cases. The opinion has much
to say of the intent of the testator in making his provisions, and this regard
for intent is quite contrary to the settled rule, which rests not at all on any
supposed intent in the given C?-Se, but on a positive presumption of law. The
opinion of the Governor and Ordinary of Jamaica in deciding the case in the
Court of Ordinary is interesting. It appears that Henry Rodon made a will
in England in favor of his sisters and a brother. He then went to Jamaica
and soon married and made settlement of his real estate, but not .of his
personal, which was considerable, UPOn his wife for life, and afterwards to
his child or children. He died soon, leaving his wife enciente, and a posthumous daughter was born, the respondent in the case The Governor
thought it clear when the ·will was made there was no contemplation of marriage. ''The question then comes, whether his deed of settlement gave a
secure ( ?) and sufficient (?) provision for his child, or whether the best
part of· his property (that is, bis personal estate) should· go away from his
child to half-sisters • • • There is a cliild, now eighteen months olcj, entirely
dependent on her mother for every present and future benefit, during such
mother's life, and that mother, a young woman about twenty-five years of age,
and having recently married again." The Governor was not a lawyer, but
under the circumstances of this case it seemed to a layman that though he
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might "possibly be wrong in the law of the case," he was positiVe that be was
not wrong in equity. Not impugning the affection of the mother for her
child, he notes no proof on the second marriage of provision for the child,
so as to make her independent of the stepfather, who may have married the
widow "on some consideration of her property acquired by Rodon." This
ingenious suggestion that the provision for the child must be immediate, and
not dependent on the death of the mother, does not seem to accord with the
cases reviewed in MarsfO# v. Fos-, StlP,CJ, but the.facts in this case are so
different from those in the Cadywold case, as to make it no authority, for in
the Rodon case the will took the property away from the widow and mother,
while in the other it carried the entire property to them.
Before leaving this maze of errors we may notice that this whole doctrine
of revocation by implication of law from change of circumstances, seems to
have been imported from the Roman law, and is not indigenous to the English. That marriage and birth of a child should revoke a wilt is said to be
triced to Overinlry v. Ovn-b11r:;, 2 Show. 242 (1682), 89 Eng. Reports 915 and
footnote, and text writers wrongly, but quite generally, cited this case as
authority for the doctrine. Jarman Treatise on Wilts, •123, Underhill on the
Law of Wilts, Sec. 239, Rood on Wilts, Sec. 37S. Woerner, The American
Law of Administration, Sec. 54- It is true that the Court of Delegates did
borrow the notion from the civilians, who regarded a wilt which failed to
provide for children as inofficioswm testamentum, but the Overbury case
said not a word abont marriage. To make a wilt: "and afterwards have
children" and die is the case there put. But the English courts soon held that
there must be both marriage and birth of children. L_'ll{J!J v. Lt1gg, 2 Salk,
592 (16g6), Doe d. White v. Barford, 4 M. &.S. 10 (1815). It is not strange
to find the· ecclesiastical courts thus influenced by the Civil Law, see Sheplserd
v. Sheplsn-d, note to ST. R. 51, but we have seen how in Marston v. Fox, .nipra, the entire bench of common law judges at Westminster approved the
doctrine. And American cases and statutes have generally followed the· English. Balduiin ·v. Spi;iggs, 65 Md. 373, Durfee v. Riscls, 142 Mich. 504. McLarrsey's Estate, 153 N. Y. 416.
·
The question was fully considerM by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Ingersoll v. Hopkins, 170 Mass. 401. The court erroneously
cites Goods of Cadywold, swpra, as authority for the English interpretation
of the Statute of l Viet., passed nine years after the Cadywotd wilt was made,
and holds that under the Massachusetts statute a wilt made in contemplation
of marriage is revoked by realizing on that contemplation, and that the Massachusetts statute, which, unlike the English, provides· for an exception if
"it shalt appear from the will itself that the wilt was made in contemplation
of such marriage," requires that this contemplation shall appear on the face
of the will, and all evidence not derived from ·the will itself is excluded. On
this it may be remarked, 1. That the Cadywotd case cited is no authority as
to a will under l Viet.,. 2. That the only other case cited as interpreting the
English statute, Otway v. Sadleir, 33 L. T. I{>, was an Irish case also reported
in 4 Ir. Jur. N. S. w. in which the Irish court said, "I cannot introduce any
qualification into the 18th Section which I do not find in the Statu~· This
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rule of interpretation, if it had been followed in Marston v. Fo-x, would have
forbidden any revocation by presumption under the Statute of Frauds. It
may be noted in passing that Wills, Part VIII, p. s62 of the Earl of Halsbury's Monumental.Laws of England, vol. 28 (1914), lays down the same
construction of the statute, and cites only these two cases, Goods of Cady1vold, supra, which is no authority. for a will under the Act 1 Viet, and this
Irish case. On turning to the list of contributors it appears that Part VIII
was· contnoutcd by the late Irish Master of the Rolls, and a member of the
Irish bar. They have, of course, interpreted the Statute as Parliament must
have intended, but with results that arc quite absurd when the will, like the
Cadywold will, gives all to the wife and "children. We may agree with Sir C.
Cressw~l, that not only at first sight, but at every other sight, this result
seems, not only rather but altogether startling. The positive language of
Parliament in 1 Viet may require this conclusion as to wills made after
Jan. 1, 1838, but in Massachusetts the courts have ·not that defense, for, 3.
the Massachusetts stattite d<>cs not apply this i:ule of revocation when it ap-pcars from Ute will itself "by fair inference from its provisions as applied to
the parties and the; subjects to which it relates, that the will was made in
contemplation of the marriage that was subsequently solemnized," -to use the
paraphrase of the trial judge who had upheld the will. The high court found it
must "appear" on the face of the will. The fact that the will gave to the
contemplated wife all the property and made her one of the executors was
not enough, because it required evidence outside the will to show that a will
giving all to Mary Alice Payson, who within a year became his wife, was
ma~e in contemplation of marriage. This was a strict and narrow construction, and in its results so absurd as to defeat the obvious intent of the statute
without furnishing a single safeguard against fraud. It is always necessary
to go outside the will to determine the identity of devisccs and legatees. A
gift to my only son, John, requires evidence alivnde to identify John. The
fact that a man gives all his property to Mary Alice Payson, "single woman,"
ought to be appearance enough on the face of the will to prevent his marriage
to her soon after from defeating his purpose in making the will. It is suggested in Francis v. Marsh, 54 W. Va. 545, that a man can always prevent this result by republishing the will after marriage. This, however, is cold comfort to
the wife whose husband has died in ignorance of any such absurd requirement of the law. We remark on this case, 4- That fortunately the cases are
few where the testator would fail in his will to make some reference to his
intended marriage. There seems to have been no case in Massachusetts since
Ingersoll v. Hopkins {18g8), and that case has never been cited on that point
in any other jurisdiction This is in part at least due to the fact that the
wording of most statutes would not permit such a result, the Michigan statute, to take one instance; providing in express terms for "revocation implied
by law from subsequent changes in the conditions and circumstances of the
testator." If we- may judge what the Michigan court would. do from its
language in a late case under this Statute, D11rfee v. Risch, 142 Mich. 504
(1905), we may conclude it would follow Marston v. Fox and not Goods of
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Cadywold. This language is, ''The reason of the law is the essence and soul
of the law."
In threading this maze of errors this note is already too long'. It may
close without further notice of the present state of the law as to the revocation of wills by marriage, than a reference to two recent ~ reviewing the
subject, Hoy v. Hoy 93 Miss. 732. and annotations in 25 LR. A. N. S. 182
{I909), Herzog v. Trust Co. 6-J Fla. 54, Ann. Cas. 19I7 A ·20I, and annotations
~~

&C~

Al.n:NATION oF CoNTIN~NT ~vAINDOS. The recent case of Bisby v.
Walker, 169 N. W. 4/q, decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa November 23,
I9I8, is an interesting instance of an all too common lack of appreciation
and understanding of the very fundamentals of pre>perty law.
.
Under the will of her grandfather B became entitled to a contingent remainder {at least the court treated it as such) in certain lands; the contingency upon which her taking depenaed was her being one of the surviving
children of her mother at the time of the death of the life tenant, the testator's widow. During the continuance of the prior estate and therefore
while her remainder was canlingent B executed several mortgages, some describing the mortgaged property by metes and bounds and some as an her
"right, title, and int~est'' in the devised lands. These mortgages all contained covenants for title or recitals indicating an intention to convey "absolute title in fee simple." While the remainder was. still contingent. and after
the execution of all of the mortgages but one B went through bankruptcy and
received the usual discharge. It was held, undoubtedly correctly so, that the
mortgages were enforceable liens upon B's interest in the devised lands after
the death of the life tenant, B having survived her.
At common law contingent remainders being considered in the nature of
mere possibilities (sec Fulwood's Case, 4 Co. 641>, 66b; Ltnnpefs Case, IO Co.
~a) were deemed incapable of alienation by a conveyance at law, "otherwise
than by way of cstoppcl by fine (or by a common recovery, etc.)" Ft.Uta:,
CoNTING!NT ~XAIND6S, *p. 537. As to the operation of cstoppel in these
cases see Doe d. Christmas v. Olwer, IO B & c, 181. If, then, in Iowa contingent remainders such as B had in the principal case are incapable of con.veyance except by the operation of an estoppcl, it was necessary for the court
to consider whether the mortgage deeds were such as to raise an estoppcl
and the effect thereon af a discharge in bankruptcy. Considerable space is
takeµ up by the court in concluding that the mortg:lge deeds were such as to
raise an estoppeL It is then concluded that the discharge in bankruptcy did
not affect· the inurement of the after acquired title, though no attention is
given to the exceedingly interesting and nice point argued by PRolltssoR
GRAY and disposed of by Mr. JusTICS HoLK£S for· 1}1e court in Ayer v. Philadelphia & B Face Brick Co., 159 Mass. 84. The bankruptcy discharge, so it
was said, could not affect the mortgagee's rights, for the mortgage lienJ! had
fastened upon the property more than four months prior to the petition in
bankruptcy I
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Coptingent remainders in England were made alienable by 8 & 9 Viet. c 1o6
(1845) "the provision being a sweeping one. It is provided that "a contingent,
an executory and a future interest, and a possibility coupled with an interest ·
***whether the object of the gift or limitation of "such interest or possibility
be or be not ascertained* * * may be disposed of by deed." In this country
statutory provisions to the same effect though generally not so explicit are
common. See STIMSON, Av.." S'l'. LAW, "§1420. In Michigan the provision, essentially the same as in ~cw York, provide5 that "Expectant estates are descendible, devisable and alienable, in the same manner as estates in possession."
Howai.'s STATS. (211d ed.) 1o657. The remarkable thing about the principal
case is that in Iowa it has been settled that the statute providing that "Every
conveyance of -real cState passes all the interest of the grantor therein, unless
a contrary intent can be reasonably inferred from the terms used," enables a
contingent remainderman to make effective conveyances of the remainder.
This was settled fa M cDorsald v. Bonk, 123 Iowa 413; in whicll the remainders
in question ·were contingent in the same way ~ in the principal case. The
M cDorsald case was cited by the court at the outset, with the statement that
"The mortgages, then, were valid when executed,'' which statement of coU!"se
is in kecPing with the observation, referred to above, that the discharge in
bankruptcy did not displace the pre-existing liens created by the mortgages.
Without realizing that they had thus decided the case in the first two sentences stating the law applicable to the facts, the court went on to a consideration of the matter of inurement of after acquired title apparently being
led utray by several earlier Iowa cases, which are cited, in which the question of inurement by cstoppel was vitally important for the reason that the
conveyances or mortgages were made at a time when the grantor or mortgagor had no interest in the premises, not even a contingent remainder.
It is held where contingent remainders are alienable that a mortgage thereof may be foreclosed even before the contingency is determined. Peoples'
Loon and Exchange Bonk v. Garlington; 54. S. C. 413. And this would seem
entirely proper.
·
R. W. A.
W1TNESs-CoKPSTENCY oF AN Al.LoPATH1c ExP£RT IN TH£ FI£I.D oF HoKo£OPATBY-0PINION ON VERY FACT TB£ JURY >I.UST Dt'l'ERHINt. VonSickle v.
Doolillle, (Ia., 1918), 16!) N. W. 141, was an action for malpractice against
a physician of the homa:opathic school of medicine.
Upon the trial, a
physician of the allopathic school was called, and after testifying that he
was unskilled in the science of hom~athy, was allowed to testify
that the treatment shown to have been given to the patient by defendant,
would produce no physiological effect, and that proper treatment required
the giving of such medicines as would produce such effect. This_ was held
error upon ~e ground that the defendant was called to treat the patient as a
homceopathic physician and that his only obligatidn was to exercise such
care and skill as was common to practitioners of that school of ~edicine, and
the wituess having been shown to be unskilled in the science ot medicine as
practiced by that school, was not qualified to speak as expert in the field in-
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volvcd. This would seem to be the only ruling which would avoid a fruitless
controversy in the court room between two schools of medicine whose apostles
would hesitate to agree on so simpl.! a proposition as that the normal man
has one and not two livers.
It doubtless is one answer to such an action that the patient got what he
asked for, if he got treatment according to the standards of the school to
which the practitioner called belonged, and cannot complain that the result
was not what he had hoped, ·and the court seems to have adopted this view.
But suppose the P.atient at the time of the treatment is non compos mentis
and cannot make the request for treatment; that the physician, discovering
his condition, gives the treatment out of a spirit of humanitarianism only,
and the patient recovering, brings his action to recover for claimed malpractice. Would he be entitled to recover, if he could satisfy a jury that the care
and skill exercised was not that common among practitionCflS of medicine in
that community? Would it be enough to defeat such attion that he did exercise that measure common to practitioners in his particular school, that of
homte0pathy? Docs the liability depend at all upon th~ fact that in the one
cas,c the patient engaged for homte0pathic treatment and got it, and in the
other did not, and got it? Unless the physician is to be penalized for acting
on his humanitarian impulses it would seem reasonable to conclude that if
the physician used the care and skill common to practitioners o"f a school
which the law recognizes and licenses, he should be held harmless. The record docs not indicate that the Good Samaritan's nostrum was diluted quite
to the extent of that shown to have been used in this case, but he seems not
on~, not to have been condemned for bis act, but to have been considered
worthy of imperishable memory.
One paragraph of the opinion reiterates the fallacious doctrine that ~
expert witness cannot express an opinion upon the very question which the
jury must determine by its verdict. Why not? That the only question a jury
has to determine in a particular case is whether fact X exists haS" never been
thought to be a good objection to the testimony of A, who has had opportunity to personally observe whether it does exist, that it docs or docs not
exist. His testimony is received because it bas a tendency to assist the jury
tc;> a correct determination of the question at issue,· that of the existence of
fact X.
For precisely the same reason should we say, that if the jury after .having.
heard the testimony ~ to what were the circumstances accompanying the
death of A and finding what they were, is unable to tell what these conditions mean, it is proper to call one who is able to say that they mean that A
died of typhoid fever, or that he died of arsenical poisoning, as the case may
be? As in the previous case the testimony is taken because it furnishes just
the information the jury lacks. Fenwick v. Bell, l C. & K. 312; Poole v. Dean,
152 Mass..589; Snow v. R. Co., 65 Mc. 231; Littlejohn v. Shaw, 159 N. Y. 188;
Western Coal&: M. Co., v. Berberich, 3(J C. C. A. 364V. H. L.

